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THE CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS BANK 
F AlLURE: HOW DID IT HAPPEN? 
by Paul F. DeCain 
I. Introduction 
"In many regards Continental is the best 
commercial bank in the country" (Osborne, 
1980, p. 173). As this statement by Kenneth 
West, President of Harris Trust, suggests, 
many considered Continental Illinois Bank to 
be one of the finest banks in the country. At 
the end of 1980, the bank was the leading 
lender in the U.S. and, according to Duns Re-
view (1978), was one of the five best managed 
American companies. Yet, by May 11, 1984, 
this once highly regarded institution was losing 
money at the rate of $8 billion a day; and by 
June the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion had taken over all the major operations of 
the bank (Forsyth and Kerwin , 1984, p. 15). 
Essentially, the seventh largest bank in the 
U.S. had failed. 
It is the purpose of this article to analyze 
the major causes of this very significant bank 
failure. First, attention will be directed to the 
immediate cause of the failure, a run on the 
bank in the spring of 1984. Next, the role of 
nonperforming loans as a contributing factor to 
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the run on the bank will be discussed. And 
finally, the ultimate cause of Continental 's col-
lapse will be analyzed-the overly-aggressive 
management strategy adopted in the 1970s. 
II. The Run 
On May 15, 1984 sixteen major banks, led 
by Morgan Guarantee, supplied Continental Il-
linois Bank with a safety net (temporary source 
of funds) of $4.5 billion (Wall Street Journal, 
May 16, 1984, p. 1). The purpose of the safety 
net was twofold: first, to allow Continental to 
meet its daily liquidity needs; and second, to re-
assure creditors of the safety of their deposits. 
Shortly thereafter, the Federal Depository In-
surance Corporation, along with a group of · 
twenty-five major banks, provided Continental 
Illinois with a $2 billion capital infusion , for the 
same purposes noted above (Forsyth and Ker-
win, 1984, p. 15). Ever since the collapse of the 
Oklahoma-based Penn Square Bank in the 
middle of 1982, Continental, which was linked 
to Penn Square through the purchase of over 
$1 billion of Penn Square loans, had been in 
poor financial condition. But what were the 
particular events and conditions which in early 
1984 caused the run on Continental's capital 
and subsequently the biggest bank bailout in 
U.S. history? 
Continental's financial condition at the 
end of 1983 was extremely depressed. Its fourth 
quarter earnings had declined by 39%, and its 
nonperforming loans 1 stood at $1.9 billion 
(Wall Street Journal, January 20, 1984, p. 4). 
Yet, the bank was still paying its quarterly divi-
dend of 50 cents a share. However, two events 
occurred in early 1984 which led many credi-
tors of the bank to withdraw their deposits, 
thus causing a run on capital. On February 14, 
Moody's lowered Continental's long term debt 
rating from A-2 to A-3 because of the increased 
risk of holding Continental debt instruments 
(Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1984, p. 
44). On March 16 Continental sold its credit 
card business to Chemical Bank for $176 mil-
lion (Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1984, p. 
7) . The effect of the lower rating of Continen-
tal's long term debt is obvious: it simply further 
depressed the market for Continental certifi-
cates of deposit (COs) . On the other hand, the 
significance of the sale of the credit card 
business is not so obvious. Continental had to 
meet its quarterly dividend of 50 cents a share 
or a run on capital would be imminent. Missing 
a quarterly dividend payment is a significant 
financial indicator of a company in very bad 
condition; and in the case of a bank, such an 
omission could lead to a run on capital. In 
order to meet this dividend payment, Continen-
tal was forced to rely on one-time gains from 
the sale of assets; hence the sale of the credit 
card business. The fact that Continental's earn-
ings were so weak that it had to count on capi-
tal gains to show a profit and pay out dividends 
gave a clear indication to creditors of the 
bank's condition, and no doubt instilled in 
them a fear for the safety of their deposits. 
Finally, on April 23 it was reported that non-
performing loans had increasect by $400 mil-
lion from the first of the year to a total of $2.3 
billion , or 8% of total loans. The increase was 
largely due to an influx of $200 million dollars 
in nonperforming loans from Latin America 
(Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1984, p. 8) . 
Because nonperforming loans are a burden on 
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future profits, this particular increase, which 
was both untimely and large, further weakened 
the confidence of creditors in the bank and its 
financial condition. 
Even though the events described above 
were the leading causes of the run on bank cap-
ital by creditors, the size and scope of the run 
were magnified greatly by the fact that most of 
Continental's deposits were very large (over $1 
million) as well as by the fact that a good por-
tion of Continental's creditors were foreign 
(over 50%). By law the FDIC is only required to 
guarantee up to $100,000 of one particular de-
posit and is not required to guarantee foreign 
deposits. Thus, a majority of Continental's de-
posits were uninsured, making the bank excep-
tionally vulnerable to the massive withdrawals 
which began in late April. Clearly, the various 
events and conditions of early 1984 precipitat-
ed the run on Continental's capital, while the 
size of Continental's deposits and the non-
domestic character of over 50% of the deposi-
tors made the magnitude and scope of the run 
as large as any since the Great Depression. 
And so in May of 1984, the volume of with-
drawals began to grow while fewer COs were 
rolled over, as first Japanese creditors, then 
European creditors, and finally U.S. ~reditors 
withdrew their deposits. Continental was forced 
to borrow heavily from the Federal Reserve as 
it was losing capital at a rate that was nonsus-
tainable. Thus, with Continental and perhaps 
even the entire banking system at the edge of 
disaster, the bailout commenced. 
III. Nonperforming Loans 
Although all of the factors discussed in the 
previous section were major immediate causes 
of the run and subsequent bailout of Continen-
tal, the most significant long term cause of the 
deterioration of Continental's financial condi-
tion was its enormous accumulation of nonper-
forming loans. A nonperforming loan is a loan 
with a high probability of default, one which 
will most likely lower the level of a bank's future 
profits. The growth in size of this non perform-
ing total at Continental from 1982 through 
1Nonpcrforming loan-a loan which has not paid in-
terest within 90 days . 
1984 was a major cause of the bank's weaken-
ing condition and eventual failure. 
The $2.3 billion of non performing loans as 
of May 15, 1984 included large portions from 
several major industries and had a number of 
similarities and common characteristics. Most 
of the nonperforming loans fell into one of 
three categories: energy related loans, real 
estate loans, and loans to Latin American 
countries. In order to understand the process 
by which the bank accumulated this burden, 
each of these significant segments of the non-
performing total will be briefly examined. 
The highest portion of the non performing 
loan total in Continental's loan portfolio were 
energy-related loans. These were loans to oil 
and gas producers, oil and gas research com-
panies, oil and gas distributors, and refineries. 
Since 1953 Continental had been a leader in 
such lending, and during the late 1970s total 
energy related loans at the bank grew from $2 
billion to $5 billion. In fact, by 1982 they com-
prised over 15% of Continental's total loans 
(Business Week, July 19, 1982, p. 52). Eventu-
ally, a great many of these loans stopped paying 
interest while some even defaulted. 
Continental had acquired a good portion 
of its energy related "problem" loans from only 
a few companies. The single major source of 
such loans originated with the purchase of 
Penn Square loans in the middle of 1982. Penn 
Square was an Oklahoma-based bank which in 
early 1982 had nearly 25% of its loans overdue. 
Faced with imminent bankruptcy, Penn Square 
was desperately looking for potential loan pur-
chasers. Because the business "looked so lucra-
tive" (Business Week, October 11, 1982, p. 85), 
Continental bought over $1 billion worth of 
loans from Penn Square (probably the single 
most damaging mistake in the bank's history), 
and over half were written off by the end of 
1982. As mentioned, most of these loans were 
energy related , with loans to two firms-Nucorp 
Energy Inc. and GHR Energy Corp.-account-
ing for nearly $250 million of the nonperform-
ing total. All told, energy related nonperform-
ing loans made up over 40% of the $2.3 billion 
non performing total in early 1984 (Wall Street 
Journal, May 16, 1984, p. 1). 
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There were several reasons for Continen-
tal's large number of energy loans. During the 
late 1970s and early 1980s Continental 
operated on the assumption that the demand 
for oil (and its price) would continue to rise as it 
had throughout the early and mid-1970s. As 
John Reading, a Senior Vice President at Con-
tinental, stated, "We're dealing with a com-
modity which is scarce and going to get 
scarcer" (Business Week. July 19, 1982, p. 52). 
Had the demand for and price of oil continued 
to rise, many of Continental 's borrowers would 
have been able to compete in the oil and gas 
market, and a good many of Continental's 
energy loans would probably not have gone 
"sour." However, with the weakening of OPEC 
in the early 1980s, the price per barrel of oil 
stabilized at about $32.00 and the once "scarce 
commodity" suddenly became abundant. Sub-
sequently, many of the energy companies to 
which Continental had loaned began to falter. 
These were largely companies which were de-
veloped in anticipation of a continual rise in oil 
prices and which simply could not offer their oil 
and gas at the stabilized price. One after 
another of these companies folded, as Conti-
nental realized how devastating its stand on 
energy lending in the 1970s would be to the 
bank's very existence in the 1980s. 
Although it is well known that energy loans 
were at the heart of Continental's loan prob-
lem, it is not as well recognized that Continen-
tal's real estate lending to construction com-
panies and developers also contributed greatly 
to its difficulties. In fact, Continental's real 
estate loans had grown rapidly from 1977 to 
1981 and at the beginning of 1982 comprised 
fully 12% of its loan portfolio. To the chagrin 
of Continental's loan officers, nearly 33% of its 
total 1982 nonperforming loans were real es-
tate loans (Business Week, October 11, 1982, 
p. 82). Several of the · more notable non per-
forming loans to real estate businesses included 
ones to Mclean Gardens (a 720-unit condomin-
ium development outside Washington, DC), a 
Florida luxury condominium development, and 
a Chicago developer called American Invesco 
(Business Week, October 11, 1982, p. 82). 
Together these three loans contributed over 
$400 million to Continental's nonperforming 
loan total. 
As in the case of the energy loans, there 
were several reasons for Continental's disas-
trous experience with real estate lending. Dur-
ing the period from 1978 to 1982, the value of 
new construction in the U.S. fell from an an-
nual level of $181 billion to $150 billion while 
the number of new housing starts over the same 
period declined from 2,036,000 to 1,072,000 
(Statistical Abstract 1984, p. 736). The entire 
real estate business in the U.S. was suffering 
severely during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
and those real estate companies to which Con-
tinental had loaned fared no differently. The 
declines in the construction and development 
fields were primarily a result of rapidly rising in-
terest rates-from 11.75% in 1978 to 21.50% 
in 1980 (Statistical Abstract, 1984, p. 736). 
These high rates made debt (a necessity in the 
real estate business) very expensive and in turn 
forced many builders and developers to fold. 
To an already very dangerous level of nonper-
forming loans was thus added a substantial 
volume of "bad" real estate loans. 
The third type of loans which contributed 
notably to Continental's nonperforming total 
were those to developing countries-in par-
ticular, loans to Latin America. By the end of 
1983 Continental had outstanding loans of 
$4 76 million to Brazil, $699 million to Mexico, 
$436 million to Venezuela and still more to 
other Latin American developing countries 
(Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1984, p. 1). The 
reasons why so many of these loans defaulted in 
the early 1980's are directly related to the re-
cent international debt crises. The oil price 
shocks of 1974-1980 added a total of $260 bil-
lion to the total import costs of oil-importing 
developing countries from 1973 to 1982. Inter-
est rates, which rose rapidly during 1981 and 
1982, added a further $40 billion to the debt 
servicing costs of developing countries. Further-
more, the global recession of 1981-82 cost 
developing countries an estimated additional 
$100 billion in foregone exports (Cline, 1984, 
p. 12). Finally, the oil producing developing 
countries (particularly Mexico and Venezuela) 
were greatly weakened by the oil and gas glut 
and consequent price stabilization of the early 
1980s. 
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All in all, these external shocks (coupled 
with domestic problems2) seriously worsened 
the financial and economic conditions of a 
great many Latin American developing coun-
tries (Cline, 1984, p. 12). Consequently, a high 
proportion of the loans made available to de-
veloping countries by such banks as Continen-
tal soon turned into nonperforming loans as 
these countries experienced difficulties making 
their interest payments. 
IV. Management Strategy 
The question "why did Continental Bank 
fail?" has yet to be answered in full. Undoubt-
edly, the run on Continental's capital in early 
1984 was the immediate cause of the bank's 
failure. Furthermore, the large amount of non-
performing loans which Continental had ac-
cumulated was a direct (though longer run) 
cause of the bank's failure, creating as it did a 
financially weakened bank which was extremely 
vulnerable to a run on capital. Yet, neither the 
run nor the nonperforming total was the ulti-
mate cause of Continental's downfall. In any 
corporation, success or failure is ultimately at-
tributable to management, and Continental is 
no exception. Specifically, Continental's down-
fall can be traced to the management goals and 
techniques which guided the corporation dur-
ing the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Continental's management strategy from 
the middle 1970s to early 1980s can best be 
described as "extremely aggressive." Before 
Roger Anderson took over as Chief Executive 
Officer in 1973, Continental Bank rested in the 
shadow of First Chicago Bank in Chicago and 
was known as an undramatic, conservative, and 
fairly "colorless" institution. In fact, it has been 
said that there was a time when the way to "get 
ahead" at Continental was to turn down loan 
proposals (Osborne, 1980, p. 173). Clearly, this 
kind of atmosphere was not'conducive to high 
growth. But when Roger Anderson assumed 
control as Chairman in 1973, the bank em-
barked on a series of aggressive assaults on 
various segments of the banking market. Under 
2These domestic problems included the exodus of 
capital in Mexico and Venezuela caused by overvalued ex-
change rates and inadequate domestic interest rates. 
Anderson's leadership, Continental's outstand-
ing loan total almost doubled from 1973 to 
1979 (from $4.9 billion to $9.6 billion) while 
the bank expanded its market share by 40% 
(Osborne, 1980, p. 173). Furthermore, from 
1978 to 1981 Continental's loan portfolio grew 
by 22%, compared to an average growth of 
14% at such other major banks as Irving Trust, 
Chase Manhattan, and Chemical Bank. Over 
the same period the bank's leverage increased 
dramatically, with asset growth of 82% and 
equity growth of 69% (Business Week, July 19, 
1982, p. 52). Anderson's goals for Continental 
were ambitious ones and were intended to 
point Continental in the direction of massive 
growth and expansion. These goals included 
Continental becoming one of the top three 
lenders in the U.S., a goal which eventually led 
Continental to make many loans which were 
simply too risky. For example, in 1977 Contin-
ental loaned $35 million to Pillsbury Co. by of-
fering an interest rate of 9.375%, which at the 
time was 105 basis points below the second 
best bid of 10.425%. In 1978 Gamble-Skogmo 
Corporation had enjoyed little success in 
searching for funds because of a significant 
amount of subordinated debt and a recent 
downgrading in its credit rating on its senior 
notes. Nonetheless, Continental offered the 
corporation a $5 million loan and a line of 
credit of $10 million at 9.5%, almost a full per-
centage point below the market rate (Business 
Week, May 14, 1979, p. 114). In 1981, Con-
tinental's exposure at AM International was 
gradually being reduced as the company ap-
peared to be headed for bankruptcy. But in 
that year Richard Black took over as CEO at 
AM International. Shortly afterward, Executive 
Vice President George Baker at Continental, 
believing that Black would turn the paralyzed 
company around, authorized that still more 
money be loaned to AM International (Busi-
ness Week, October 11, 1982, p. 82). In the 
words of one observer, "Continental was willing 
to offer whatever rate or terms were necessary 
to swing a deal" (Business Week, May 14, 
1979, p. 114). The goal of becoming one of the 
top three lending institutions in the country 
was only one of many which Continental strived 
to achieve, but it demonstrates the lengths to 
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which management was willing to go to accom-
plish this objective. 
In addition to pursuing a risky lending 
policy, Continental's management structure 
during the 1970s was highly decentralized. 
Anderson's staff was given a remarkably free 
hand while lending officers had major powers 
and very few controls placed upon them. Ac-
cording to Business Week (October 1982, p. 
82) "The mandate came from the top-how you 
went about dealing with the mandate was more 
or less your own business." Lending require-
ments at Continental were also very relaxed: 
only two senior officers were needed to commit 
the bank to loan to its legal limit, 10% of capi-
tal. In contrast, at Manufacturer's Hanover all 
loans had to be approved by one of the top 
three officers of the bank, and at First Boston 
loans exceeding $1 million had to be approved 
by a committee of senior officers. Although 
many bad loans were made in the 1970s be-
cause the bank was far too aggressive and am-
bitious, many other bad loans were made simply 
because of the lack of credit "quality control." 
As one ex-loan officer at the bank stated, "In 
the years I was there, I never had a loan pro-
posal turned down" (Osborne, 1980, p. 174). 
Examples of this lack of credit quality control 
include the request of Litton Industries for a 
$40 million loan in 1978; it took just seven 
minutes for the loan officer to come up with an 
affirmative reply. To cite yet another example, 
Continental became a major lender to a firm 
known as Energy Cooperative after First 
Chicago and Harris Trust had refused to grant 
additional credit. According to Business Week, 
"Continental was accepting less quality credits 
for increased market share" (May 14, 1979, p. 
115). 
In general, a corporation's growth or decline 
is largely dependent upon its management, and 
Continental's rapid growth throughout the late 
1970s was to a great extent due to its very am-
bitious goals and limited controls on lending 
activity. As a mark of its success over the short 
run, Continental's return on equity increased 
from 12.7% to 15.1% during the period 1973-
1979 at the same time that its net income in-
creased from $85 million to $196 million. The 
bank was able to grow at such a rate because it 
was aggressive and was willing to loan to riskier, 
but potentially more profitable, firms. Roger 
Anderson was convinced that the troubled loans 
the bank would incur would be few and far out-
weighed by the sheer volume of good loans 
(Business Week, October 11, 1982, p. 82). 
Although Continental indeed flourished for 
nearly a decade under such aggressive and de-
centralized management, it was these same 
management policies which were eventually to 
result in its decline. 
V. Conclusion 
As we have seen, Continental's manage-
ment goals and methods led the bank to loan 
to far too many risky borrowers, a course of ac-
tion which eventually led to a nonperforming 
loan total that threatened the bank itself. Con-
tinental offered large ambitious loans to energy 
companies, to real estate concerns, and to 
foreign developing countries-all very volatile 
sectors. The unbridled zeal for lending at the 
bank led to a substantial lack of credit quality 
control and to far too many risky loans. As one 
bank consultant aptly described Continental's 
predicament, "Aggressive marketing mixed 
with decentralized lending and rapid expansion 
creates a situation in which there is much less 
sense among officers of what kinds of credit are 
acceptable" (Business Week, October 11, 
1982, p. 84). As a result, by 1984 Continental 
was plagued with $2.3 billion worth of nonper-
forming loans which were draining net income 
and distressing creditors. 
The Continental downfall came as a sur-
prise to many, but upon reflection it really 
shouldn't have. Simply stated, the bank's man-
agement was far too ambitious and decentral-
ized to survive in the very competitive U.S. 
banking industry. 
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